

Some Boots are Made for Walking: Congressional Voting Behavior in Response to Changing District Boundaries^{*}

Michael H. Crespin
Political Institutions and Public Choice Program
Michigan State University

Abstract

In this essay, I use a quasi-experimental research design to examine how democratic representation is affected by redistricting. Specifically, I test how members respond to competing pressure from their district and party on two sets of votes, final passage and procedural. Using a simple spatial model and an empirical test, I build upon previous research to test if members change their behavior in response to shifts in district boundaries after the 2000-02 round of congressional redistricting. The results indicate that representatives adjust their roll call behavior to fit their new districts on votes that are visible to their constituents. However, when it comes to votes that are important to the party for controlling the agenda, any movements are not related to modifications in the district. Further, members' ability to adapt to their new district diminishes as the percentage of new constituents increases. Finally, these results also have implications for the congressional organization literature.

^{*} Apologies to Nancy Sinatra and now apparently Jessica Simpson

Introduction

What are the implications for representative democracy after a redistricting? The Downsian model of elections predicts that elected representatives will change their behavior to correspond with the new district median (Downs 1957). Previous scholars, (Glazer and Robbins 1983, 1985; Stratmann 2000; Boatright 2004) have demonstrated that members of congress will modify their voting patterns in predictable ways in response to changes in district boundaries. Does this result apply to all types of votes or does it only pertain to votes that are visible to the district? The congressional organization literature contends that parties can control legislative outcomes through agenda control by pressuring members to vote with the party on procedural matters (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2002, 2005). This is an effective technique because it is difficult to trace voting on procedure to changes in real policy (Arnold 1990). If members in altered districts are not also adopting new positions on procedural votes, then representation at the district level may be present, but at a sub-optimal level.

In this essay, I use a quasi-experimental research design to determine how redistricting affects democratic representation by examining how members respond to competing pressure from their district and party. By developing hypotheses based on theories from the congressional organizations literature and then testing them empirically, I build upon previous research to assess whether members change their behavior in response to shifts in district boundaries after the 2000-02 round of congressional redistricting. The results indicate that representatives adjust their roll call behavior to fit their new districts on votes that are visible to their constituents. However, when it comes

to votes that are important to the party for controlling the agenda, movements in district boundaries are not related to members' roll call decisions.

In the following section, I briefly review some of the congressional elections and legislative organization literature to reveal different expectations regarding the motivations for members' voting behavior in the U.S. House of Representatives. Then, based on that literature, I develop testable hypotheses that predict why members may change their ideal points after redistricting on some votes but not on others. Next, I empirically test the hypotheses using basic econometric techniques and in the final section, I discuss the implications for the findings.

Electoral Accountability

A basic principle of representative democracy is that elected officials must pay homage to their districts if they wish to secure reelection. Edmund Burke, of course, would have done well to heed this advice. As the well known parable goes, Burke was not reelected to Parliament following his famous speech to the electors at Bristol when he proclaimed his own views to be superior to those of his constituents. The idea of electoral accountability is prevalent in many theories of representation and elections. The Downsian model, in its simplest form, predicts that candidates representing the parties will converge to the district median in order to win elected office (Downs 1957)¹. Although more nuanced versions of the model (e.g. Aaronson and Ordershook 1972; Calvert 1985; Palfrey 1984) predict some degree of divergence depending on the presence of primary elections, motivation of the candidates, the completeness of

¹ See also Hotelling 1929 and Black 1958.

information and the wish to deter potential third party challengers, they all depend on district preferences.

In a less formal fashion, Froman (1963) argued that constituency is the most important determinant of member behavior and that members may even need to exercise some independence from the party to increase their chances of reelection. If there is a conflict between party and district, the member should choose the district since the costs of party defection surely is less than losing the next election (9).

Fiorina (1974), Mayhew (1974) and Arnold (1990) all theorized that members of Congress will pay attention to their district when they are deciding how to vote on the floor and subsequently how it will influence their reelection chances. Fenno (1978) posited reelection, along with institutional and policy goals contribute to the decision making calculus. During his travels with representatives in their districts, members frequently remarked that their vote choice was often dependent on how certain parts of the constituency would react.² When a larger group of members were asked questions about representation on surveys, they also indicated that district plays a part in roll call decision making (Clausen 1973; Kingdon 1981; Sullivan et al. 1993).

Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan (2002) argued that members are held accountable at the ballot box based on their legislative history. Specifically, they found that the more often a member supports her party, the lower her vote share and the probability of retaining office decreases. Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001), Bovitz and Carson (2000) and Erikson and Wright (2005) also found support for this notion. Meanwhile, Carson (2005) demonstrated that members are more likely to face a

² Bishin (2000) later found empirical support for Fenno's earlier anecdotal evidence involving sub-constituencies.

quality challenger the more often they vote with their party on key issues.³ In sum, members say they care about the ideology of their districts when they are deciding how to vote and the empirical evidence suggests that representatives also act as if it is important. Additionally, evidence suggests that voters are paying attention (or at least acting as if they are) since there is a possibility that when members begin to ignore their districts and vote in too extreme a fashion, they are punished at the polls.

Although the electoral accountability literature finds that members who are a good match for their district do better at the polls, it does not directly test if representatives are able to (or chose to) adapt to changes in their district. While Poole and Rosenthal (1998) have argued that members “die with their ideological boots on,” that is, members do not change their voting behavior over their careers, one exception to this rule has been when a member’s district changes as a result of redistricting (Glazer and Robbins 1983, 1985; Stratmann 2000, Boatright 2004). These scholars found that members are indeed responsive to changes in their district.⁴ Through similar research designs but various measures of behavior (conservative coalition scores, ADA scores and, DW-NOMINATE) they all concluded that as a district becomes more liberal or conservative so does the representative. Based on these results, it appears that some members do not just happen to “fit” their district, rather many are willing to actively adjust their behavior if their district changes.

³ These results hold even though surveys indicate that voters are frequently not well informed about their representatives. See Stokes and Miller 1966, Mann 1978, or Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996 for more on the public’s knowledge of candidates. For more research on how member’s voting behavior can influence their election results see Schoenberger 1969, Erikson 1971, Johannes and McAdams 1981, Brady et al. 1996 and Jacobson 1996.

⁴ See Poole 1998 for a critique of Glazer and Robbins 1983.

Theories of Congressional Organization

In comparison to the literature on electoral accountability, a substantial segment of the congressional organization literature argues that party plays a consequential role in deciding legislative outcomes.⁵ If this body of work is to be believed, then party must surely play a part in helping members to decide how to vote. One sub-section of the literature which falls under the label “conditional party government,” argues that party strength is conditional on internal party homogeneity and external heterogeneity between the two parties (Rohde 1991; Aldrich and Rohde 1998, 2000, 2001). When both conditions hold, rank-and-file members give up power to the leadership so the party can “encourage” members to act in ways to further the party’s goals. One way to stay in favor with the leadership is to vote with the party when needed on important legislation.

Another related theory, cartel theory, tells us that the key to legislative success in Congress is not necessarily trying to enforce party discipline on substantive votes, but lies in controlling the agenda (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2002, 2005).⁶ Here, we can think of party success in terms of positive and negative agenda control. Positive agenda control is associated with carrying legislation *forward* in the legislative process and negative agenda control is the ability to *stop* legislation from coming to a vote. Parties act as procedural cartels by exercising negative agenda control to assure that no legislation reaches the floor that could possibly split the party or move the status quo in ways that are unfavorable to the party. To make certain that such legislation (or amendments that would move policy in an adverse direction) does not receive a floor

⁵ For a thorough review of the congressional organization literature see Cox and McCubbins 2005. Of course, partisan theories are not without their critics; see e.g. Krehbiel 1993, 1999, and 2000.

⁶ Conditional Party Government and Cartel theory are not necessarily contradictory. See Finocchiaro and Rohde 2002 for a discussion of the similarities and differences between the two theories.

vote, rank-and-file members are expected to support the party on procedural votes in exchange for the possibility of securing a more powerful position in the institution and increase the probability of maintaining (or achieving) majority status. This idea is supported by Oleszek (2004:141) who argues that the majority party demands support on rules votes and any defectors could be punished.

Although positive agenda control is conditional and hence variable, negative agenda control, Cox and McCubbins (2005) argue, is not conditional but constant. They argue that, “party pressure can affect members’ decisions on procedure more than their decisions on substance,” (66). This gives members more freedom to vote their district on substantive votes but not on procedure. Of course, this does not mean that party does not *try* to pressure members on final passage votes, only that the party is relatively more successful when it comes to keeping members in line when it comes to voting on procedure.⁷ This point is demonstrated by the high percentage of votes that are party unity votes on procedural motions, 89.1% versus final passage votes, 38.7% (Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen 2002).⁸

Although previous research (Glazer and Robbins 1983, 1985; Stratmann 2000, Boatright 2004) found that members are adapting to meet their new districts, their research designs did not account for the fact that members may be more responsive to their district on some votes and more responsive their party on others. In other words, representatives may vote with their district on substance, but by voting with the party on

⁷ Sometimes the party can pressure members on final passage. In the 108th Congress, for example, House Republicans held open the vote on the Medicare bill for three hours while the leadership successfully pressured C.L. "Butch" Otter (ID) and Trent Franks (AZ) to vote yes in order to secure passage. Jackie Koszczuk and Jonathan Allen “Late-Night Medicare Vote Drama Triggers Some Unexpected Alliances,” *CQ Weekly* (11/29/2003) p. 2958

⁸ Where a party unity vote is defined as a majority of one party voting against a majority of the other.

procedure they can stop legislation from coming to a vote. If legislation that the district wants never comes to a vote because of procedure, then the district, one could argue, is not fully represented. If we truly want to know if members are adapting to their new constituencies, and providing complete representation, then I argue that it is necessary to look separately at votes that are visible to the district, namely final passage votes, and votes that are important to the party but largely invisible to the district, procedural votes.

If cartel theory is correct and the party applies strong pressure on procedural votes but members are relatively free to vote their district on final passage, then it follows that as a member's district median moves, she should modify her behavior on final passage votes in the direction of the change. However, if the party demands discipline and is able to force members to vote against their district on procedural matters, then it should also follow that changes in the district should *not* be related to shifts in voting on partisan procedural motions. Rather changes in the party median should explain any shift in voting behavior on procedural votes. We can think of members having two masters to serve, but each puts emphasis on different matters. Members have to please their district on substantive matters and their party on procedure. The task, however, is not as troublesome as it may appear since procedural voting, which can stop any potentially troublesome issues from coming to the floor, is not visible to the district. This way, members will not be forced to choose between their district and the party when it comes to roll calls that are noticeable by the district.

District Change and Behavior Change

In order to test these hypotheses, I take advantage of the same quasi-experiment presented by the shifting of district boundaries as a result of redistricting that Glazer and Robbins (1983, 1985), Stratmann (2000), and Boatright (2004) used.⁹ In this “experiment,” a member’s district -and the ideological characteristics therein- is allowed to vary while the party affiliation is held constant.¹⁰

I use the spatial model depicted in Figure 1 to provide a visual representation of my argument. Each of the two lines represents the ideological spectrum before and after redistricting with liberal on the left and conservative on the right. Each member has two ideal points, one for reelection that is largely a function of district characteristics and is based on votes that are visible to the district and one for the party that is a function of party pressure and is realized through voting on procedure. Based on the theoretical expectations, I assume that a) procedural votes are largely invisible to the district but final passage votes are visible, and b) the party is more successful at pressuring members on procedural votes.

In the figure, $X_{i,t}^R$ represents the district reelection ideal point, for member i at time t , where t is some period before redistricting and $X_{i,t}^R = f(\text{district characteristics, party pressure and personal preferences})$. $X_{i,t}^P$ represent the individual party ideal point that member i at time t must meet in order to avoid punishment from the member’s party. Note that there is a party ideal point for each member (although it need not be unique),

⁹ This is a quasi, rather than a natural experiment, because the changes in the district boundaries are not random nor are they under control of the researcher. Instead, they are the result of actions other actors. See Campbell and Stanley 1963 for a discussion of quasi-experiments.

¹⁰ This experiment is, in effect, the mirror image of Nokken (2000, 2005) and Nokken and Poole (2004) who hold districts constant but allow party to move for party switchers. Their findings confirmed the notion that a member’s voting behavior will change if he switches parties, even as the district remains constant.

not one point for the entire party since some defection may still occur. It is further assumed that $X_i^P = f(\text{party pressure})$.¹¹

Between time t and $t+1$, the district boundaries for each member's district may change as a result of redistricting and in many cases, this will cause a shift in district characteristics.¹² Further, since the make-up of the House also changes, the individual party ideal points can also shift.¹³ The new ideal points will then be $X_{i,t+1}^R$ and $X_{i,t+1}^P$.

Based on the spatial model and theoretical expectations, I will test the following hypotheses over two sets of votes, final passage and procedural:

H1: As a member's reelection ideal point shifts left (right) the member's behavior should shift left (right),

H1₀: As a member's reelection ideal point shifts left (right) the member's behavior should *not* shift left (right),

and

H2: As a member's party procedural vote ideal point shifts left (right) the member's behavior should shift left (right),

H2₀: As a member's party procedural vote ideal point shifts left (right) the member's behavior should *not* shift left (right),

If the reelection ideal point is a function of district characteristics, as the electoral accountability literature suggests, then as a member's district changes, their behavior should shift accordingly between periods t and $t+1$. This means that H1₀ should be

¹¹ It is not necessary to assume that X_i^P is more extreme than, X_i^R and the theoretical expectations will not change if it fell to the left or right of X_i^R . These ideal points do not necessarily have to be the medians, but rather some point that allows the member to secure reelection for the member. Research by Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart 2001 demonstrates that members do not converge to the district median, rather Democrats are to the left and Republicans are to the right. This may be related to personal policy preferences, the threat of a primary opponent or other reasons. See Fiorina 1999 for a discussion of why members may diverge from the district median. Similar logic can be applied to the party ideal points. It is only necessary to have some ideal point that is representative of the party. It could be the median, but could also be represented by the "leadership".

¹² For simplicity, I assume that a member's personal preference will not shift between the two periods.

¹³ I am purposely being agnostic about why the individual party ideal point may change. It could be a change in the agenda, leadership, or rules.

rejected on votes that are visible to the district (final passage) and can influence a member's reelection chances. Conversely, since the individual party ideal point is *not* a function of individual district characteristics, then I expect to fail to reject the null hypothesis that changes in the district should produce shifts in X^P_i between periods t and $t+1$. This hypothesis provides a critical test of the theoretical expectations. If changes in the districts predict changes in an individual's member's party ideal point, then this would be evidence against the theory.

Both the electoral accountability literature and the congressional organization literature predict that party can *sometimes* pressure members on votes that are visible to the district. This suggests the secondary hypothesis, H2. If party pressure is strong for visible votes, then $H2_0$ should be rejected if the party ideal point changes after redistricting, but not if party is weak. Finally, cartel theory predicts that party can pressure members on procedural votes, therefore, I expect to reject $H2_0$ on these types of votes, if the party ideal point shifts.

Data

In order to measure members' voting behavior on votes that are visible to the district and procedural votes, I use a variation of Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) w-NOMINATE procedure to estimate ideal points on both subsets of votes.¹⁴ More specifically, I use a "bridging" technique (see Rivers 2003, and Bailey and Chang 2001).

¹⁴NOMINATE procedures in general are based on the theoretical assumptions from the spatial theory of voting used to develop my hypotheses (Poole and Rosenthal 1985, Lewis and King 1999). Alternative measures such as ADA scores cannot be used since they do not differentiate between substantive and procedural votes and are also based on a relatively small subset of votes. Dw-NOMINATE also cannot be used because it needs $n > 2$ congresses to calculate a score and is based on all votes, not just different subsets of votes. Finally, since others have used different measures and found significant changes in behavior after redistricting, I think it is reasonable to assume that any significant results are not a function of the scaling procedure.

The technique calls for two members from the wings of each party to be used as glue to bridge the two sessions together in order to insure comparability. In this case, I used Tom Delay who has been described by *Politics in America* as possessing a “conservative zeal,” and Jose Serrano the most liberal member of the House according to *National Journal*.¹⁵ Both sessions are then estimated using one roll-call matrix to obtain ideal points for each member for the first sessions of the 107th and the 108th Congress with the same procedure used for both vote-type categories. The coding for the vote-types is based on a categorization by Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen (2002) and applied to the Rohde (2004) dataset for subsets of the 107th and 108th Congresses. All bills and resolutions that had a recorded final passage vote are included in the visible vote category since they are easily linked to policy outcomes. Meanwhile procedural motions that enable partisan advantage such as voting on special rules, the motion to recommit or moving the previous question make up the procedural grouping.¹⁶

Similar to previous work by Rothenberg and Sanders (2000) and Boatright (2004), it is necessary to calculate the ideal points for two time periods, one before the exogenous shock (redistricting) and one afterwards. I chose the first session of the 107th Congress (2001) as the pre-redistricting period and the first session of the 108th (2003) as the post-redistricting stage. In the first session of the 107th, states were beginning to formulate redistricting plans while by the first session of the 108th Congress, nearly every multi-district state with the exception of Maine had enacted their new plan.¹⁷ If the entire

¹⁵ Note that in an alternative model, I estimated the ideal points separately for each session and the results were similar, with the exception of the change in party median variable where I did not have theoretical expectations in the final passage votes regression. It was significant using the alternative technique.

¹⁶ The appendix lists the specific types of votes in each of the two categories. In the first session of the 107th Congress, there were 230 final passage votes and 85 partisan procedural votes. For the first session of the 108th Congress, there were 283 final passage votes and 176 partisan procedural votes.

¹⁷ Maine redistricted in 2003.

107th Congress were compared to both sessions of the 108th, it is likely that some of the behavioral shift will be missed since members will have begun to change their behavior in the second session of the 107th in time for the 2002 elections.¹⁸ Further, I only included members who were incumbents and ran for reelection to the 108th Congress since retirees and higher office seekers may not change their behavior in ways to suit their new congressional district (Rothenberg and Sanders 2000).¹⁹ In order to measure changes in member behavior, I subtract the member's NOMINATE score for the 108th Congress from the score for the 107th for both subsets of votes to create two separate dependent variables, *Final passage* and *Partisan procedural*.²⁰ Since NOMINATE ranges from -1 (liberal) to 1 (conservative) this means that a positive change in scores corresponds to a shift to the left and a negative difference means the representative moved to the right.²¹

To gauge district change I use two measures, one political measure which is the standard change in the presidential vote in the district (Glazer and Robbins 1983, 1985; Stratmann 2000; Boatright 2004) and another variable that more generally captures the degree of district continuity after redistricting based on new population. The first measure, change in *Presidential vote*, is taken from *CQ's Politics in America* and is the difference between the two-party Democratic share of the vote in 2000 and the share of the vote recalculated to the new district boundaries for the 2002 elections. Since this measure spans a redistricting, it was necessary to match up the correct districts corresponding to where members stood for election before and after redistricting. Based

¹⁸ On this point, see Boatright 2004.

¹⁹ Including retirees and higher office seekers does not change the results.

²⁰ These variables correspond to $(X_{it}^R - X_{i,t+1}^R)$ and $(X_{it}^P - X_{i,t+1}^P)$ respectively.

²¹ For example, John Dingell (D-MI) was at -.326 in the 108th Congress and -.532 in the 107th Congress, therefore $-.532 - -.326 = -.206$ means he shifted to the right.

on the theoretical expectations, the sign on the coefficient for this variable should be negative and significant for final passage votes but not different from zero for procedural votes.

The second measure of district change, detailed in Crespin (2005), is created by using geographic information systems to spatially intersect district boundaries for the 2000 and 2002 congressional elections. These new areas are then overlaid on top of census tract boundary files. After this step, the census tracts are deemed new (drawn into the incumbent's district), removed (drawn into a new district and no longer remaining in the incumbent's district) or continuous (remain in the district pre and post-redistricting). After this step, the population of the tracts that are new to the incumbent's district is divided by the total district population and the result is the percent of the population that is new to a member's district. This measure, percent *New population*, is included in the model separately and also interacted with the change in presidential vote in order to capture political and population change in the district. The interaction allows for a variable that measures both direction and magnitude of change. As districts receive a greater percentage of new constituents, I expect it to be more difficult for members to gauge the political make-up of the new geographic constituency. These three variables are used to test hypothesis one. In order to test hypothesis two, I created a variable that measures the change in the *Party median* from the first session of the 107th Congress to the first session 108th for each sub-set of votes to gauge the effect that changes in the party ideal point has on a member's behavior.²² If members are moving with their parties, then this variable should be positively signed.

²² Bernie Sanders (I-VT) is coded as a Democrat since he votes with them to organize the House.

The theoretical expectations and hypotheses are displayed in Table 1. First, the effect of district change should be *negative and significant* for the final passage votes model, but *not different from zero for procedural votes*. Again, this is the key test of the paper. Rejecting the null will provide strong evidence against the partisan theory. Second, the change in party median variable *may* be significant in the final passage model if the party is able to exert pressure on these types of votes but it will have a significant effect for voting on procedure since party theory argues that party applies pressure on procedural votes. Since the dependent variables (the change in a member's ideal point from time t and $t+1$) are theoretically continuous, ordinary least squares regressions are used to estimate the results.

Results

Table 2 displays the results from both regressions.²³ In the final passage vote regression, the change in presidential vote is negative and significant, suggesting that member's of congress change their voting behavior in accord to changes in the district. If a district becomes more conservative (or liberal) so does the member and is consistent with the previous research (Glazer and Robbins 1983, 1985; Stratmann 2000; Boatright 2004). This result suggests that the elections literature is correct, members act in

²³ In order to test the robustness of the findings, I ran diagnostics and estimated several other regressions. Since both models suffer from heteroskedasticity, the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used to obtain robust standard errors. A test for outliers revealed that none were substantially influencing the results. I also estimated models with state fixed effects and another regression that corrects for multiplicative heteroscedasticity to determine if individual states were influencing the results. In either case, they were not. The difference in the number of cases between the two models is a result of not being able to estimate ideal points for all members in the procedural vote category. Again, this does not substantively change the results since they were similar if the models were run on the same set of members. Finally, various other measures of party such as a simple dichotomous variable or shifts in party leadership ideal points were tried and the conclusions drawn were once again quite similar.

accordance with their district's preferences in order to secure their reelection goal. The coefficient on change in the party median, however, is not significant, suggesting that although there is anecdotal evidence of parties influencing voting on substance; in this case I do not find any systematic evidence to support the claim.

The results from the partisan procedure regression show that as a member's district changes, they do *not* change their behavior accordingly. Instead, the results suggest that shifts in the parties' ideal points and the resulting pressure to conform influences changes in their voting behavior on procedural votes. This is evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient on the party variable. Further since this variable and the dependent variable are measured on the same scale, the coefficient of .93 means that as the party moves, individual members move nearly the same distance. This result gives support for the partisan theories of legislative organization, especially cartel theory which argues that the party will use procedural motions to exert agenda control. Since the engine for agenda control is procedure, this is where we would expect to find the strongest party influence. This is also substantiated by the relatively large adjusted R^2 (.84) for a model with party as the only significant variable. Further, the procedural votes model does a much better job at explaining the variance in changes in voting behavior since the R^2 for the second model is quite large relative to the first.²⁴

In order to interpret the district change terms correctly, I turn to a graphical procedure suggested by Brambor, Clark and Golder (2005). Their procedure calculates substantively meaningful marginal effects and correct standard errors for interaction terms. Figure 2 displays the marginal effect of district political change on voting

²⁴ Although the R^2 for the final passage vote model is quite small at .03, it is consistent with other similar studies.

behavior change, conditional upon the percent new population in the district for both models. The solid line in each of the graphs is the marginal effect while the curved dashed lines indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals. If the confidence intervals bound the dotted zero line, then the variable is not significant at that point. In the final passage model, we see that the marginal effect of district political change is negative until percent new in the district reaches just over 32 percent when the variable is no longer significant.²⁵ The increasing slope of the line indicates that the effect dissipates the more the district changes. The decreasing effect is likely indicative of growing uncertainty about district characteristics. Fenno (1978) found support for this notion in his district travels as one urban congressman remarked about his redistricted territory:

“Let me pull over to the curb and look at the map. I can’t tell whether this area is in the district or not. It could be, but I’m not sure. That must have been some redistricting when the congressman who represents the district can’t even tell whether he’s in it or not,”(6).

If the members elected to serve in a district do not know who is in and out of their district, then this implies that there may be a learning curve for members becoming acquainted with new parts of their district when the boundaries change by large amounts.

In the partisan procedural model, the confidence intervals continuously bound zero and the solid marginal effect line actually lies *above* the zero line signifying that no matter how much the district changes, members do not change their behavior accordingly, providing strong evidence in support of the key hypothesis. In sum, (see table 3 for a summary of the findings) representatives change their behavior in accordance with theoretical expectations on votes that their constituents (or their potential opponents) are paying attention to. This give support to the simple Downsian hypothesis

²⁵ This range represents nearly 75 percent of the cases.

that elected officials will alter their own ideal points in order to secure reelection or other goals. In contrast, shifts on yeas and nays on procedural motions are not related to movements in the district median, rather party explains much of this change. Finally, we only see evidence of members moving with the party on procedural matters, not final passage.

Conclusion and Discussion

The results demonstrate that when a member's district changes, they shift their voting behavior on votes that their constituents are paying attention to, specifically, votes on final passage. However, I fail to find a relationship between district changes and how a member behaves on votes on which the party exerts influence, namely procedural votes. Although we generally need to be careful about drawing conclusions from null hypotheses, the chosen research design alleviates several of the problems. First, since both hypotheses are tested over *identical* models that only allow the dependent variable to vary, we can be more confident that the null results are not just a function of chance. Second, the null result of no effect is the prediction of the theory, not just the usual hypothesis test that assumes a null of zero. Finally, providing evidence in support of a theory with null results is not without precedent (See e.g. Krehbiel 1992 and Cox and McCubbins 2002).

I also find that changes in party medians explain a large share of the shift in voting on procedural votes, but not on final passage. In sum, members appear to be wearing two pairs of boots, only one of which is made for walking. Although this paper does provide evidence that “parties matter,” it also implicitly shows how they matter.

While previous research has demonstrated that members vote in accordance to their new districts, the findings may obscure the effects of party. If negative agenda control can keep issues off the floor, and members are not representing their new district on these types of votes, then representative democracy may not be working as well as previous research implied. Rather, it appears that elected officials are only representing their districts when they are paying attention and not voting with their new constituents when they can get away with it on procedural matters. Based on these results and what the literature says about the importance of procedural control, I can conclude that a changing constituency may not be getting everything it wants from their members of congress.

In future work, I hope to better link member's voting behavior on various vote-types to their election results. Although previous research has demonstrated that members are punished or rewarded based on voting behavior, it does not test this hypothesis over different types of votes. If constituents are not paying attention to how a member votes on procedure, then we should not expect to find a link between election outcomes and these types of votes.

References

- Aldrich, John H., and David W. Rohde. 1998. "The Transition to Republican Rule in the House: Implications for Theories of Congressional Politics." *Political Science Quarterly* 112: 541-67.
- Aldrich, John H., and David W. Rohde. 2000. "The Consequences of Party Organization in the House: The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties in Conditional Party Government." In Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, eds. *Polarized Politics: Congress and the Presidential in a Partisan Era*. Washington: CQ Press.
- Aldrich, John H., and David W. Rohde. 2001 "The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection." In Lawrence Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 7th ed.
- Ansolahehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart III. 2001. "Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 45: 136-159.
- Aranson, Peter H. Peter C. Ordeshook. 1972. "Spatial Strategies for Sequential Elections." In *Probability Models of Collective Decision Making*, ed. Richard G. Niemi, Herbert F. Weisberg. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill.
- Arnold, R. Douglas. 1990. *The Logic of Congressional Action*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Bailey, Michael and Kelly H. Chang. 2001. "Comparing Presidents, Senators, and Justices: Interinstitutional Preference Estimation," *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 17(2): 477-506.
- Bishin, Benjamin G. 2000. "Constituency Influence in Congress: Do Subconstituencies Matter?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. 25: 389-413
- Black, Duncan. 1958. *The Theory of Committees and Elections*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boatright, Robert G. 2004. "Static Ambition in a Changing World: Legislators Preparations for, and Responses, to, Redistricting," *State Politics and Policy* 4:436-454.
- Bovitz, Gregory and Jamie Carson. 2000. "The Electoral Consequences of Position-Taking in Congress: Exploring the Relationship Between Roll Call Behavior and House Election Results." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.

- Brady, David W., John F. Cogan, Brian Gaines, and R. Douglas Rivers. 1996. "The Perils of Presidential Support: How the Republicans Captured the House." *Political Behavior* 18:345-68.
- Brambor, Thomas, William Clark and Matt Golder. 2005 "Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses" Forthcoming in *Political Analysis* 13.
- Burke, Edmund. *Select Works of Edmund Burke, and Miscellaneous Writings*. Library of Economics and Liberty. Retrieved April 21, 2005 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Burke/brkSWv4c1.html>
- Calvert, Randall. 1985. "Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence." *American Journal of Political Science* vol. 29, pp. 69-95.
- Campbell, Donald T. and Julian C. Stanley. 1963. *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Design for Research*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- Canes-Wrone, Brandice, David W. Brady and John F. Cogan. 2002. "Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting," *American Political Science Review*, 96:127-140.
- Carson, Jamie L. 2005. "Strategy, Selection, and Candidate Competition in U.S. House and Senate Elections." *The Journal of Politics*. 67: 1-28.
- Clausen, Aage. 1973. *How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2002. "Agenda Power in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1877-1986." In David W. Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins, eds. *Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress: New Perspectives on the History of Congress*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins, 2004. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Crespin, Michael H. 2005. "Using Geographic Information Systems to Measure District Change, 2000-02," *Political Analysis* 13:253-260.
- Crespin, Michael H., David W. Rohde, and Ryan J. Vander Wielen. 2002. "Variations in Party Voting in the House of Representatives, 1953-2000." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association.

- Delli Carpini, Michael X. and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know about Politics and Why it Matters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Erikson, Robert S. 1971. "The Electoral Impact of Congressional Roll Call Voting." *American Political Science Review* 65: 1018-32.
- Erikson, Robert S. and Gerald C. Wright. 2005. "Voters, Candidates, and Issues in Congressional Elections." In Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds. *Congress Reconsidered 8th ed.*. Washington D.C.: CQ Press.
- Fenno, Richard F. 1978. *Homestyle: House Members and their Districts*, Boston: Little Brown.
- Finocchiaro, Charles J. and David W. Rohde. 2002. "War for the Floor: Agenda Control and the Relationship Between Conditional Party Government and Cartel Theory." Presented at the 2002 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1974. *Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies*. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1999. "Whatever Happened to the Median Voter?" A paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.
- Froman, Lewis A. 1963. *Congressman and Their Constituencies*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Glazer, Ami, and M. Robbins. 1983. "Voters and Roll Call Voting: The Effect of Congressional Elections." *Political Behavior* 5:377-90
- Glazer, Amiahi and Marc Robbins. 1985. "Congressional Responsiveness to Constituency Change," *American Journal of Political Science*, 29: 259-73.
- Hotelling, Harold. 1929. "Stability in Competition," *Economic Journal* 39: 41-57.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 1996. "The 1994 House Elections in Perspective." *Political Science Quarterly* 111: 203-23.
- Johannes, John R., and John C. McAdams. 1981. "The Congressional Incumbency Effect: Is It Casework, Policy Compatibility, or Something Else: An Examination of the 1978 Election." *American Journal of Political Science* 25:512-42.

- Kingdon, John W. 1981. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1992. *Information and Legislative Organization*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. "Where's the Party?" *British Journal of Political Science* 23: 235-66.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1999. "Paradoxes of Parties in Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 24: 31-64.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 2000. "Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship." *American Journal of Political Science* 44: 212-27.
- Lewis, Jeffrey B. and Gary King. 1999. "No Evidence on Directional vs. Proximity Voting." *Political Analysis* 8:21-33.
- Mann, Thomas. 1978. *Unsafe at Any Margin: Interpreting Congressional Elections*. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.
- Mayhew, David. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Nokken, Timothy P., 2000 "Dynamics of Congressional Loyalty: Party Defection and Roll-Call Behavior 1947-97," *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 25: 417-44.
- Nokken, Timothy. 2005 "Party Switching and the Procedural Party Agenda in the US House of Representatives, 1953 – 2002" Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 7 – 10, 2005, Chicago, IL.
- Nokken, Timothy P., and Keith T. Poole. 2004. "Congressional Party Defection in American History," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 29: 545-68.
- Oleszek, Walter J. 2004. *Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process* 6th ed. Washington D.C.: CQ Press.
- Palfrey, Thomas, 1984. Spatial Equilibrium with Entry. *Review of Economic Studies*: 51: 139-156.
- Poole, Keith T. 1998. "Changing Minds? Not in Congress!" GSIA Working Paper #1997-22. Carnegie-Mellon University.
- Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1985. "A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll-Call Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 29(2):373–399.

- Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ramsey, J.B. 1969. "Tests for Specification Errors in Classical Least Squares Linear Regression Analysis," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B*, 31: 350-371.
- Rivers, Douglas. 2003. "Identification of Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models," Stanford University typescript.
- Rohde, David W. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rohde, David W. Roll Call Voting Data for the United States House of Representatives, 1953-2004. Compiled by the Political Institutions and Public Choice Program, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, 2004.
- Rothenberg, Lawrence S., and Mitchell S. Sanders. 2000. "Severing the Electoral Connection: Shirking in the Contemporary Congress." *American Journal of Political Science* 44: 316-325.
- Schoenberger, Robert A. 1969. "Campaign Strategy and Party Loyalty: The Electoral Relevance of Candidate Decision Making in the 1964 Congressional Elections." *American Political Science Review* 63: 515-20.
- Stokes, Donald E. and Warren E. Miller. 1966. "Party Government and the Salience of Congress," *Elections and the Political Order*, Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, eds. New York: Wiley.
- Stratmann, Thomas. 2000. "Congressional Voting over Legislative Careers: Shifting Positions and Changing Constraints," *The American Political Science Review*, 94: 665-676.
- Sullivan, John L., L. Earl Shaw, Gregory E. McAvoy, and David G. Barnum. 1993. "The Dimensions of Cue-Taking in the House of Representatives: Variations by Issue Area." *Journal of Politics* 55: 975-97.

Table 1 – Hypotheses and Predictions

				Party-Influence Predictions on Voting Behavior	
		Final Passage Vote Regression	Procedural Vote Regression		
Δ Reelection Ideal Point	(β_1)	$H_1: \beta_1 < 0$	$H_{10}: \beta_1 = 0$		
Δ Party Median	(β_2)	H_2 or $H_{20}: \beta_2 ? 0$		$H_2: \beta_2 > 0$	

Where $\beta < 0$ corresponds to a shift to the right

H1: As a member's reelection ideal point shifts left (right) the member's behavior should shift left (right),

H1₀: As a member's reelection ideal point shifts left (right) the member's behavior should not shift left (right),

H2: As a member's party procedural vote ideal point shifts left (right) the member's behavior should shift left (right),

H2₀: As a member's party procedural vote ideal point shifts left (right) the member's behavior should not shift left (right),

Table 2 – Change in Member Voting Behavior as a result of Redistricting

Variable	OLS Coefficient (Standard Error)	
	Final Passage Votes	Partisan Procedural Votes
<i>District Change</i>		
Δ Presidential Vote (2000 Dem. vote in old district – new district)	-.016* (.007)	.006 (.006)
% New Population	.0007 (.0004)	-.00009 (.0004)
Δ Presidential Vote \times % New Population	.0003* (.0001)	-.00006 (.0002)
<i>Party</i>		
Δ Party Median	.138 (.112)	.934* (.022)
Constant	-.434* (.057)	-.014 (.011)
<i>N</i>	356	353
Adj. R ²	.03	.84
F	2.85*	517.96*


*p < .05

Dependent Variable – 107th Congress first session NOMINATE minus 108th Congress first session NOMINATE. Negative coefficient corresponds to a shift to the right. Only members serving in both Congresses and not retiring or running for higher office in the 2004 elections are included.

Table 3 - Substantive Results


Variable	Final Passage Votes	Partisan Procedural Votes
Δ Presidential Vote (2000 Dem. vote in old district – new district)	As the Democratic presidential vote in the district increases, the member becomes more liberal (See Figure 2)	As the Democratic presidential vote in the district increases, behavior <i>does not</i> change
% New Population		
Δ Presidential Vote × % New Population		
Δ Party Median	Members do not move in the direction of the party median	Members move in the direction of the party median

Figure 1 – Spatial Representation of District Change



- Where $X_{i,t}^R$ is the reelection ideal point for member i at time t and $X_{i,t}^P$ is the party ideal point for member i at time t .
- $X_{i,t}^R$ may shift as a result of redistricting, members should respond on final passage voting, but *not* on procedural votes.
- X_t^P may shift as well, members should respond on procedural votes and possibly on final passage votes.

Figure 2 - Marginal Effect of District Change on Voting Behavior Change



Graphs by Vote-type

Appendix

Final Passage Votes

Passage of a Bill
Final Passage of Conference Report
Final Passage of Joint Resolution
Passage over Presidential Veto
Suspension of Rules for a Bill
Suspension of Rules for a Joint Resolution
Suspension of Rules for Conference Report
Motion to Suspend the Rules and Concur
Amendments to the Constitution
Final Passage of Resolution
Adoption of Concurrent Resolution
Suspension of Rules for Concurrent Resolution
Suspension of Rules for a Resolution
Adoption of First Part of Resolution
Adoption of Second Part of Resolution

Partisan Procedural

Budget Waivers
Motion to End Debate
Motion to Rise from the Committee of the Whole
Motion to Disagree
Passage of Rules (Special Rule)
Motion to Recede
Motion to Order Previous Question
Election of Speaker
Motion to Recommit
Motion to Instruct Conferees
Motion to Recede and Concur
Previous Question on Special Rules