

**Different Votes for Different Folks:
Procedure, Passage and Electoral Accountability**

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Research on electoral accountability has demonstrated that more extreme members get punished at the polls. In this paper, we test if this finding applies to all types of votes or only those that are more visible to constituents. We argue that procedural votes, which the majority uses to control the agenda, are largely invisible to constituents while final passage votes can be more easily traced back to the member. As such, we find that members are punished for voting with the party on final passage but not on procedural votes. These results differ between minority and majority party members as majority party members are punished more on final passage votes but actually rewarded for voting with the party on procedural votes.

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Introduction

Recent work by Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan (2002)¹ has demonstrated that members of Congress are held accountable at the polls for their legislative voting record. They found that representatives who support their party more often receive a lower vote share, *ceteris paribus*. In this paper, we seek to test whether this finding applies generally or only to votes that are visible to constituents. Specifically, we will determine if members are punished for voting with their party on relatively obscure votes on procedural matters aimed at setting the partisan agenda (such as votes to adopt special rules), or whether accountability applies only to votes that have more visible policy implications—namely final passage votes. As such, this paper offers an explicit test of the assumption from the literature on legislative organization that parties can pressure members to toe the party line on procedure because the public is either inattentive or unable to understand the intricacies of parliamentary procedure (Cox and McCubbins 2002, 2005).

In order to test our hypotheses, we will scale members' preferences on two sets of votes—final passage and procedure—using NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). After controlling for district and electoral characteristics, we can determine the influence of the various vote types on electoral fortunes. If the congressional organization literature is correct, then members should be punished more for their votes on final passage compared to voting on procedure. This has implications for both the congressional sub-field specifically and representative democracy more generally.

¹ Henceforth CBC.

Electoral Accountability

A basic principle of representative democracy is that voters will hold elected officials accountable for their actions (or inactions). Therefore, they must pay homage to their districts if they wish to secure reelection. Edmund Burke, of course, would have done well to heed this advice. As the well known parable goes, Burke was not reelected to his Bristol seat following his famous speech when he proclaimed his own views to be superior to those of his constituents. The idea of electoral accountability is prevalent in many theories of representation and elections. The Downsian model, in its simplest form, predicts that candidates representing the parties will converge to the district median in order to win elected office (Downs 1957)². Although more nuanced versions of the model (e.g. Aaronson and Ordershook 1972; Calvert 1985; Palfrey 1984) predict some degree of divergence depending on the presence of primary elections, motivation of the candidates, the completeness of information and the wish to deter potential third party challengers, they all depend on district preferences.

In a less formal fashion, Froman (1963) argued that constituency is the most important determinant of member behavior and that members may even need to exercise some independence from the party to increase their chances of reelection. If there is a conflict between party and district, the member should choose the district since the cost of party defection surely is less than losing the next election (9).

Fiorina (1974), Mayhew (1974) and Arnold (1990) all theorized that members of Congress will pay attention to their district when they are deciding how to vote on the floor and how it will influence their subsequent reelection chances. Fenno (1978) posited reelection, along with institutional and policy goals, contribute to the decision making

² See also Hotelling 1929 and Black 1958.

calculus. During his travels with representatives in their districts, members frequently remarked that their vote choice was often dependent on how certain parts of the constituency would react.³ When a larger group of members were asked questions about representation on surveys, they also indicated that district plays a part in roll call decision making (Clausen 1973; Kingdon 1981; Sullivan et al. 1993).

Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001), Bovitz and Carson (N.d.) and Erikson and Wright (2005) found support for the notion that members are held accountable at the ballot box based on their legislative history. Meanwhile, Carson (2005) showed that members are more likely to face a quality challenger the more often they vote with their party on key issues.⁴

CBC (2002) also demonstrated support for this notion. Specifically, they found that the more often a member supports her party, the lower her vote share and probability of retaining office. In sum, members say they care about the ideology of their districts when deciding how to vote and the empirical evidence suggests that representatives also act as if it is important. Additionally, evidence suggests that voters are paying attention (or at least acting as if they are) since members who begin to ignore their districts and vote in too extreme a fashion are punished at the polls. In this note, we use the CBC model as our starting point to test if members are held accountable on all types of votes or if the finding differs depending on the vote type.

³ Bishin (2000) later found empirical support for Fenno's earlier anecdotal evidence involving sub-constituencies.

⁴ These results hold even though surveys indicate that voters are frequently not well informed about their representatives. See Stokes and Miller 1966, Mann 1978, or Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996 for more on the public's knowledge of candidates. For more research on how member's voting behavior can influence their election results see Schoenberger 1969, Erikson 1971, Johannes and McAdams 1981, Brady et al. 1996 and Jacobson 1996.

Theories of Congressional Organization

In comparison to the literature on electoral accountability, a substantial segment of the congressional organization literature argues that party plays a consequential role in deciding legislative outcomes.⁵ If this body of work is to be believed, then party must surely play a part in helping members to decide how to vote. One subsection of the literature, which falls under the label “conditional party government,” argues that party strength is conditional on internal party homogeneity and external heterogeneity between the two parties (Rohde 1991; Aldrich and Rohde 1998, 2000, 2001). When both conditions hold, rank-and-file members give up power to the leadership so the party can “encourage” members to act in ways to further the party’s goals. One way to stay in favor with the leadership is to vote with the party when needed on important legislation.

Another related perspective, cartel theory, tells us that the key to legislative success in the Congress lies not necessarily in trying to enforce party discipline on substantive votes, but rather in controlling the agenda (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2002, 2005).⁶ Here, we can think of party success in terms of positive and negative agenda control. Positive agenda control is associated with carrying legislation *forward* in the legislative process and negative agenda control is the ability to *stop* legislation from coming to a vote. Parties act as procedural cartels by exercising negative agenda control to assure that no legislation reaches the floor in such a form that it could possibly split the party or move the status quo in ways that are unfavorable to the party.

⁵ For a thorough review of the congressional organization literature see Cox and McCubbins 2005. Of course, partisan theories are not without their critics; see, e.g., Krehbiel 1993, 1999, and 2000.

⁶ Conditional Party Government and Cartel theory are not necessarily contradictory. See Finocchiaro and Rohde 2002 for a discussion of the similarities and differences between the two theories.

To make certain that such legislation does not receive a floor vote, rank-and-file members are expected to support the party on procedural votes in exchange for the possibility of securing a more powerful position in the institution and increasing the probability of maintaining (or achieving) majority status. Although positive agenda control is conditional and hence variable, negative agenda control, Cox and McCubbins (2005) argue, is not conditional but constant. They argue that “party pressure can affect members’ decisions on procedure more than their decisions on substance” (66). This gives members more freedom to vote their district on substantive votes, but not on procedure.

The hypothesis that members vote with the party on procedure but not necessarily on final passage is supported by Young and Wilkins (2005), who show that members may vote aye on a closed rule but then turn around and vote nay on final passage. If members were voting their district at all times, then they should vote the same way on both the rule and on final passage. Crespin (2005), building on the Cartel model, argues that members face asymmetric pressure from the district and the party on different types of votes. Pressure is high from the party on procedural votes but low on final passage. Alternatively, members face a great deal of pressure from their district on final passage but less on rules votes. He demonstrates this point by showing that when a member’s district changes after redistricting, she only shifts her behavior to adapt to the new district on final passage votes, but not on votes that are important to controlling the agenda. As such, theories of congressional representation and accompanying empirical evidence suggest that members are more likely to vote with the party on rules but can vote with their district on final passage if there is a conflict between the two.

Rules, Final Passage and the Electoral Connection

If previous research (CBC) demonstrated that members who vote with their party more are punished at the polls, then do members who vote with their party on procedure run the same risk? We argue that they will not for two reasons. First, procedural votes are largely invisible to constituents or are too complex for voters to understand. Second, the party, especially the majority party, is able to offer electorally helpful side-payments to its members to encourage them to toe the line on procedure. In contrast, since final passage votes are more visible to constituents, members of both parties should suffer electorally the more they vote with the party on these types of votes.

When it comes to legislative procedure most constituents, we argue, are blissfully ignorant. It is unlikely that a voter will understand if a yes vote on “moving the previous question on the adoption of a special rule” is for or against the district. In contrast to constituents, the party leadership knows that a defection on this vote will cost the majority party agenda control and carefully watches how each member casts their votes. Even if a member’s district preferences are not in alignment with the rest of the party on this procedural vote, defecting at this point in the legislative process is not acceptable as far as the leadership is concerned.

Alternatively, final passage votes are much more visible to constituents. It is relatively easy to believe that a voter will be able to comprehend the meaning of voting for or against the war in Iraq or drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Even if a constituent is not paying attention at the time the vote was cast, an opponent will surely point out during the course of a campaign if an incumbent voted against the district’s preferences.

Based on the relative visibility of the two different vote types—high for final passage votes and low for procedural votes—we will initially test the following hypothesis:

H1: A member will be punished more for voting with their party on final passage votes compared to voting with their party on procedural votes.

Another reason that members may not suffer at the polls for voting with the party on procedure is the ability of the majority party to offer electorally helpful side-payments to encourage procedural party line voting. Cartel theory argues that the party has various carrots and sticks to keep members in line on procedural votes. Pearson (N.d.) tested this assumption empirically and has shown that the more a member votes with their party on procedure, the more likely they are to receive a better committee assignment, have more of their resolutions and amendments come to a vote or receive financial help from the party. Each of these items will help a member at the polls. If a member receives a plum committee assignment, they are likely able to direct goodies back to the district.

Meanwhile, resolutions and amendments can be directed towards narrow constituencies that will reward the member on Election Day. Finally, more money is always helpful to a candidate. However, these benefits, especially resolutions and amendments, are largely perquisites doled out by the majority party. Minority party members can get their preferred committee assignment but they are less likely to have their legislation come to a vote. Further, the majority has little incentive to promote resolutions and amendments that would help minority party members.

Since members of the majority are rewarded for voting with the party on procedure, this may actually help them electorally. This suggests the following hypothesis:

H2: The more members of the majority party vote with their party on procedural matters, the more they should be rewarded at the polls.

Data and Methods

In following the approach employed by CBC, we construct a similar model in order to test our hypothesis using an Ordinary Least Squares regression over the pooled 1956-1996 time-period.⁷ With the exception of the main independent variables of interest, all of the measures included in the CBC model are also included here and operationalized in the same fashion.⁸

In order to fully test the idea that a member's accountability to the district depends on certain types of votes more than others, this analysis uses scores we generated with Poole and Rosenthal's W-NOMINATE program to construct measures of ideological extremity—the main independent variables of interest. The fact that we can select a much larger sample of votes with which to generate ideological scores in comparison to those generated by Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) represents one advantage of using NOMINATE. However, the principal advantage afforded by NOMINATE is that the types of votes cast by members (procedural and final passage) can be separated, thereby allowing for a test of the cartel thesis as it applies to district accountability. Any number of broad categories of vote types could be created, but this analysis is primarily concerned with partisan votes and passage votes. Here, these two types of votes can be separated and the effect that ideological extremity on partisan roll

⁷ To account for possible heteroskedasticity, the pooled cross-sectional model uses Huber-White corrected standard errors. Aligning the 1962 districts with the 1960 presidential vote is difficult because of the widespread reapportionment that took place in the wake of the *Baker v. Carr* decision. Also because of this, the presidential vote variable discussed below is only based on the most recent presidential election for 1964 and the 1966 midterm.

⁸ Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan generously furnished the data used in CBC (2002).

calls has on district accountability can be compared with the effect of ideological extremity on passage votes. Although CBC use ADA scores, they also run their model using DW-NOMINATE and find substantively similar results.⁹ In contrast, this analysis considers members' first-dimension NOMINATE scores on two categories of votes: final passage and partisan/procedural.¹⁰ We equalize the NOMINATE scores, based on the Congress preceding the election, so as to provide a measure of roll call extremity that is consistent across the parties and is comparable to the framework presented by CBC. Specifically, our measure of *Roll Call Extremity* is computed as the actual NOMINATE score minus -1 for Republicans and the score minus 1 for Democrats (NOMINATE scores have a theoretical range of -1.0 for liberals to +1.0 for conservatives). What this operationalization provides is a measure of extremity that ranges from 0 (a Republican or Democrat at the other party's ideological extreme) to 2 (a Republican or Democrat at their own party's extreme). Thus, high values indicate ideological extremity, and lower values indicate moderation.

The inclusion and operationalization of each of the other variables stem from the criteria outlined by CBC. The dependent variable, the incumbent's vote share, is simply the incumbent's percentage of the two-party vote. Vote share is regressed on incumbents' roll call extremity for partisan and passage votes while controlling for a number of other factors hypothesized in the literature to affect vote share and incorporated in the analysis of CBC.

⁹ They do so by averaging each member's first- and second-dimension DW-NOMINATE score across all the votes scaled by the procedure (CBC 2002: 131, fn. 18).

¹⁰ The coding of the vote-types is from Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen 2002. See the Appendix for the listing of vote-types.

Presidential Vote accounts for district ideology by averaging the proportion of the two-party vote received by the presidential candidate of the incumbent's party over the previous two-elections in the incumbent's district. Normalizing the percentage of the two-party presidential vote around its mean over each of the two previous election cycles takes into account factors that may be unique to any specific presidential election, and provides an indicator of the correspondence between underlying district preferences and the party affiliation of the incumbent.

While most incumbents face only token competition when seeking reelection, some challengers have been found to be of higher quality than others and therefore pose a more serious threat to the incumbent's electoral goals. In particular, those challengers that have previously held elective office are generally thought to be of higher quality than those who have not (Jacobson and Kernell 1983). Therefore, *Challenger Quality* is coded 1 for those incumbents facing an opponent who has held elective office and 0 for those who are not.

Of course, an incumbent's institutional standing likely has an impact on electoral fortunes as well. All else equal, freshmen are generally considered among the most vulnerable of incumbents and are thus more likely to face difficult reelection prospects. For instance, freshmen are less likely than more established incumbents to have forged a personal connection with their constituents. In order to capture this, the variable *Freshman* is included where freshmen are coded as 1 and all other incumbents as 0.

Following CBC, we also control for a variety of factors that are likely to impact the expected incumbent vote share. As such, an incumbent is coded as 1 if they are of the same party as the president and coded as 0 if they are not. This *In party* variable

represents an important control given the inclusion of other control variables such as personal income, presidential popularity, and the midterm loss effect – all of which all depend on whether or not the incumbent is of the same party as the president.

In order to capture the impact of the economy, a variable that measures the change in real income per capita in the year prior to the election is included. However, it is assumed that the country's economic performance will only be positively related with the electoral fortunes of incumbents of the president's party. As such, the change in real income per capita (Δ *Personal Income*) is multiplied by -1 for those members of the opposition party. Similar logic applies to presidential approval, as we expect a positive relationship between evaluations of the president and the electoral fortunes of members of his party and a negative relationship among members of the other party. Therefore, *Presidential Popularity* captures presidential approval as measured by the Gallup Poll taken most recently prior to the election for members of the president's party; this value is multiplied by -1 for members of the out party.

Finally, a control is also included to take into account the tendency for the president's party to lose seats in midterm elections. As with the other contextual controls, *Midterm Loss* is based on whether the incumbent is a member of the president's party in an off-year election, where it is coded as 1, while remaining members are coded as 0.

Results

We begin our empirical examination of the effect of roll call voting extremity on electoral margins with an analysis incorporating two NOMINATE scores corresponding to the votes types of interest: final passage and partisan/procedural. Table 1 presents the estimates from a regression of incumbent electoral vote share on passage vote-based NOMINATE scores, procedural vote-based NOMINATE scores, and the battery of conventional election-related variables included by CBC for each election from 1956 through 1996. To account for heteroskedasticity, we report White-corrected robust standard errors.

The NOMINATE variables that deal with our hypotheses are the key aspect of this and the subsequent estimations. The first column of the table offers evidence in support of the expectation that different electoral effects apply to the various types of votes. In particular, extremity in an incumbent's record on final passage votes is significant (at $p < 0.001$) in the negative direction, as predicted. Substantively, a shift of one standard deviation in the normalized NOMINATE score (about 0.33) equates to a decrease of about 1.2% of electoral vote share. The consequences of extremity are even more striking when the comparison is made between a member with a record at the mean relative to one at the extreme—in this case, the latter member is penalized 2.25% of the vote, *ceteris paribus*. While not overwhelming, the effect is comparable to freshman status, and more than twice the diminished vote share experienced by members of the president's party in midterm elections. The impact of the electoral variables are substantively and statistically similar to those presented by CBC, and because they are

not the focus of our analysis, we will not discuss them except for instances in which our estimates differ from those they reported.

In addition to the effects of passage-related vote extremity, we are also interested in the impact of extremity on procedural matters, which we hypothesize to have less of an effect in comparison to passage votes. In line with our expectations, extremity on partisan/procedural matters exerts less of an impact on members' electoral fortunes—in this case, the coefficient, although positive, is not significant at conventional levels. A test of the specific hypothesis that the coefficient for extremity on passage is negative and larger in absolute terms than the coefficient for extremity on procedural votes allows us to reject the null of no difference with a very high degree of confidence ($F=28.85$, $p<0.001$).

To explore whether these findings are simply an artifact of multicollinearity between the two NOMINATE variables, working from the assumption that many members will have comparable levels of extremity across vote types, we estimate separate regressions for each of the vote-based measures.¹¹ The results appear in the next two columns of Table 1. First, we find that dropping the procedural vote variable from the model has a negligible impact on the coefficient for passage-vote extremity, which remains essentially unchanged from the full model. In contrast, the model that includes just procedural vote extremity and not the passage-vote measure indicates a smaller, yet still negative, relationship between roll call extremity and electoral vote share. The effect is almost exactly one-half that of the passage variable, and the 95% confidence intervals bounding each of the NOMINATE variables from the two models allow us to say that

¹¹ The actual level of correlation between roll call extremity on passage votes and roll call extremity on partisan/procedural votes is 0.688. A variance inflation factor test did not suggest that the correlation between these two variables is a problem.

passage vote extremity has a greater (negative) impact on vote margins than does procedural vote extremity.¹² Thus, even when estimating the effects of the NOMINATE-based indicators separately, the hypothesis that extremity on final passage votes carries with it greater negative electoral consequences than extremity on partisan/procedural votes is born out.

A second question which our analysis pursues is whether there are differences in the electoral ramifications of roll call extremity according to majority party status. That is, due to the likelihood of side-payments to majority party members who toe the line on the procedural matters which are tantamount to the party's agenda-setting interests, do members of the majority party see their fortunes improved through extremity (or loyalty) on these types of votes? To be clear, we are not suggesting that extremity on procedural matters is directly rewarded by constituents at the polls. Rather, the benefits that accrue to loyal majority party members carry with them positive electoral benefits in the way of credit-claiming opportunities, for example. We have little or no expectation about the minority party in this respect, as there are presumably fewer resources at hand for the minority leadership to distribute in "buying" the votes of their members. Our expectations with respect to passage vote extremity remain unchanged—since these votes are more visible and easily explained to constituents, extremity is likely to carry with it negative consequences in terms of members electoral vote shares.

To examine these possibilities, we construct interaction terms to capture Democratic (majority party)-specific effects of extremity on both passage and procedural votes. In order to properly account for the interactive nature of these variables, we also

¹² The confidence interval for extremity on passage votes ranges from -0.0409 to -0.0262, while that of procedural vote extremity ranges from -0.025 to -0.011.

include the remaining component part—a dichotomous variable coded 1 for Democratic incumbents and 0 otherwise. The estimates from this model, run on all elections from 1956 to 1994 (all of which were characterized by Democrats running as the incumbent majority party) are presented in Table 2. We begin by noting that nearly all the election-related variables are essentially unchanged in terms of their effect on electoral vote shares. The only exception is presidential popularity, which is no longer significant.¹³ Turning to the variables of particular interest to the party-specific aspect of this analysis, we find that Republicans who voted in a more extreme fashion on passage votes suffered quite severely at the polls. The effect here is more than 50% greater than in the pooled model presented earlier. Thus, a minority party member located at the extreme of the party garners 4% less of the two-party vote relative to a member at the party mean, *ceteris paribus*. At the same time, extremity on procedural votes has no discernible impact on minority party vote shares.

The findings for majority Democrats, on the other hand, are strikingly different. While the interaction of extremity on passage votes and Democratic status is not significant, the two variables relating to passage-vote extremity are jointly significant ($F=88.55, p<0.001$), suggesting that Democrats also suffer electorally for extreme behavior on these types of votes. In addition to the findings relating to passage votes, of particular interest is the significant *positive* coefficient on the interaction term for extremity on procedural votes. Taken in tandem with the simple procedural vote variable (again, the two are jointly significant with $F=57.56$ and $p<0.001$), Democratic incumbents are rewarded on election day for loyalty to the party on procedural matters.

¹³ However, as noted by CBC, the previous negative effect of this variable was unexpected, and the variation in its estimated impact is likely an artifact of the various specifications (134).

This finding, while perhaps counterintuitive, seems to square with recent accounts of parties in Congress that focus on the perquisites of majority status.

Discussion

In this paper, we have taken a preliminary step toward integrating the literature on electoral accountability with partisan accounts of legislative organization that focus on the mechanisms through which parties seek to affect legislative outcomes. A key theme running through the organizational literature is that majority parties' primary aim is to control the mechanisms of agenda setting; if they are successful in this undertaking, which carries with it significant prospects for eventual legislative success, then rank-and-file members can be freed up to "vote their district" on more visible roll calls dealing with questions such as the final passage of a bill. To the degree that such procedural votes affect downstream decisions on amendments and final passage, they are critically important vehicles for not only the parties but also various interests and constituencies. If such votes occur away from the attentive eye of voters and their agents, for whatever reason—be it inattention, inaccessibility, or ignorance—then important questions of democratic theory are raised.

Our analysis suggests that in fact it is the most visible votes cast in the House of Representatives that carry the most weight in terms of electoral accountability. Members that are more extreme in their voting on final passage are punished at the polls. In contrast, members who faithfully toe the party line on procedural votes seem not to be punished nearly as much, if at all. In fact, majority party members actually *benefit* from party loyalty on such votes.

In future analysis, we plan to extend the scope of our study to include more recent elections. Such an extension is important in that it will allow us to more fully account for the nature of procedural voting under Republican majorities, and to determine the degree to which our findings extend beyond the period of Democratic control. Additionally, we plan to incorporate campaign finance data over the subset of elections for which it is available. Finally, future analysis will build upon the results presented here to include amendment voting, alternative methods of vote scaling, and perhaps other operationalizations of roll call-vote extremity.

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Table 1 — House Incumbents' Electoral Vote Share and Roll Call Extremity by Vote Type, 1956-1996

Variable	OLS Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)		
	Full Model	Passage	Partisan/Procedural
Presidential Vote	0.429*** (0.012)	0.430*** (0.012)	0.410*** (0.011)
Challenger Quality	-0.056*** (0.002)	-0.056*** (0.002)	-0.055*** (0.002)
Freshman	-0.023*** (0.003)	-0.023*** (0.003)	-0.023*** (0.003)
Δ Personal Income (coded by In Party)	0.044*** (0.004)	0.043*** (0.004)	0.042*** (0.004)
Presidential Popularity (coded by In Party)	-0.053*** (0.011)	-0.053*** (0.011)	-0.048*** (0.011)
Midterm Loss (coded by In Party)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.003)
In Party	-0.035** (0.011)	-0.033** (0.011)	-0.031** (0.011)
Roll Call Extremity on Passage Votes	-0.037*** (0.004)	-0.034*** (0.004)	—
Roll Call Extremity on Procedural Votes	0.006 (0.004)	—	-0.018*** (0.004)
Constant	0.726*** (0.008)	0.729*** (0.007)	0.709*** (0.007)
<i>N</i>	6512	6519	6512
<i>R</i> ²	0.349	0.349	0.342
<i>F</i> -statistic	370.79***	417.27***	403.17***

** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table 2 — House Incumbents' Electoral Vote Share and Roll Call Extremity by Vote Type and Party, 1956-1994

Variable	OLS Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)
Presidential Vote	0.428*** (0.012)
Challenger Quality	-0.053*** (0.002)
Freshman	-0.019*** (0.003)
Δ Personal Income (coded by In Party)	0.040*** (0.004)
Presidential Popularity (coded by In Party)	-0.011 (0.011)
Midterm Loss (coded by In Party)	-0.009** (0.003)
In Party	-0.072*** (0.011)
Roll Call Extremity on Passage Votes	-0.058*** (0.007)
Roll Call Extremity on Procedural Votes	0.015 (0.009)
Democrat	0.004 (0.013)
Roll Call Extremity on Passage Votes * Democrat	-0.015 (0.011)
Roll Call Extremity on Procedural Votes * Democrat	0.034** (0.011)
Constant	0.742*** (0.011)
<i>N</i>	6150
R^2	0.360
<i>F</i> -statistic	285.46***

** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix

Final Passage Votes

Passage of a Bill
Final Passage of Conference Report
Final Passage of Joint Resolution
Passage over Presidential Veto
Suspension of Rules for a Bill
Suspension of Rules for a Joint Resolution
Suspension of Rules for Conference Report
Motion to Suspend the Rules and Concur
Amendments to the Constitution
Final Passage of Resolution
Adoption of Concurrent Resolution
Suspension of Rules for Concurrent Resolution
Suspension of Rules for a Resolution
Adoption of First Part of Resolution
Adoption of Second Part of Resolution

Partisan Procedural

Budget Waivers
Motion to End Debate
Motion to Rise from the Committee of the Whole
Motion to Disagree
Passage of Rules (Special Rule)
Motion to Recede
Motion to Order Previous Question
Election of Speaker
Motion to Recommit
Motion to Instruct Conferees
Motion to Recede and Concur
Previous Question on Special Rules